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The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not 
Be an All or Nothing Proposition† 
MARTIN H. MALIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) would prohibit provisions in 
employment, consumer, and franchise agreements that obligate a party to arbitrate 
claims that arise out of those relationships.1 Following the election of President 
Obama and substantial Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, it 
appeared that the bill had a reasonable chance of passage.2 Although changes in the 
political winds now make passage unlikely, Congress has enacted mini-AFAs on a 
piecemeal basis. For example, the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act 
bans pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or in tort. The act applies to employment contracts 
of defense contractors whose business with the Department of Defense (DOD) 
exceeds $1 million.3 More recently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act prohibits pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under 
the statute’s commodities and securities whistleblower provisions.4 
The debate over pre-dispute arbitration agreements has been polarized with 
proponents opposing any legislative regulations and opponents seeking a complete 
prohibition.5 Although the AFA would ban such agreements in consumer and 
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 1. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 2. See Sharon Henderson Ellis, Improving Due Process in Employment Arbitration, in 
ARBITRATION 2009: DUE PROCESS IN THE WORKPLACE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-SECOND 
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 41, 48 (Paul D. Staudohar ed., 
2010); Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn 
Plaza v. Pyett, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 825, 856−58 (2010). 
 3. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 
123 Stat. 3409, 3454 (2009). 
 4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203 
§ 748(n)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2)); id. 
§§ 922(b), (c), 124 Stat. at 1841 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(e)(1), (2)). 
 5. Compare, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against 
the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267 (2008), with David S. 
Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009). 
290 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:289 
 
 
franchise transactions as well as in employment, my focus is exclusively on 
employment. Proponents of employer-imposed arbitration systems hail such 
measures as providing relatively inexpensive vehicles for addressing employee 
claims that are more accessible than the courts and in which employees fare at least 
as well as they do in court.6 Opponents approach such claims with deep skepticism. 
They observe that these plans are imposed unilaterally by employers and are 
uniformly opposed by plaintiffs’ lawyers. They reason that this polarized approach 
to employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates must reflect a tilting of the 
playing field to the advantage of the employer doing the imposing.7 
In this Article, I take the middle ground in the legislative debate. I advocate that 
legislative reform is needed to curb employer abuses and to ensure fairness in 
employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates. In Part I, I review the current 
state of our knowledge about the experience in employment litigation and 
employment arbitration. The picture that emerges is not very clear, although I 
ultimately conclude that while increased clarity would be helpful, it is not 
necessary in resolving the debate over legislative reform. In Part II, I consider 
employer motives for imposing pre-dispute arbitration mandates on employees. I 
find a mixed bag of abusive and legitimate motives. In Part III, I demonstrate how 
courts have abdicated their responsibility to police employer-imposed pre-dispute 
arbitration mandates and have undermined efforts by arbitrators and arbitration 
service providers to self-regulate. In Part IV, I propose legislative reforms to curb 
employer abuses and argue that such reforms are superior to the AFA’s absolute 
prohibition on employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates.  
I. EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: WHAT DO WE 
REALLY KNOW? 
Empirical studies are the current rage in the legal academy. It is therefore not 
surprising that we can find many empirical analyses of litigation and arbitration. In 
this Part, I survey some of the most revealing analyses, integrating their results with 
generally understood characteristics of litigation and arbitration. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 559 (2001); Peter 
B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEORGETOWN J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 549 (2008); 
Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the Past Quarter 
Century, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 411 (2010) [hereinafter St. Antoine, ADR]; Theodore 
J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM. 783 (2008) [hereinafter St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration]. 
 7. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1259−60 (“[A]ll indications are that arbitration 
agreements are enforced almost uniformly by defendants and rarely, if ever, by consumers or 
employees. . . . Unless we assume that the parties are acting on bad information, and 
ultimately contrary to their interests, it gives rise to an inference that arbitration favors 
defendants.” (footnote omitted)). 
2012] ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT 291 
 
 
A. Employment Litigation 
AFA proponents decry the enforcement of employer-imposed pre-dispute 
arbitration mandates for allowing “corporate defendants [to] opt out of the court 
system by the simple expedient of writing arbitration agreements into their standard 
form contracts.”8 Yet when one considers the employer advantage in employment 
litigation in federal court, one is left wondering why an employer would ever want 
to leave the federal court system. A study by Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab 
published in 2009 comparing data from the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts to similar data they had studied five years earlier paints a graphic 
picture of a federal court playing field that is anything but level for plaintiffs in 
employment cases. They summarized their findings: 
Today employment discrimination plaintiffs still must swim against a 
strong tide—in the federal district court and on appeal. Findings for 
these cases compared to other civil cases include fewer early 
terminations and more trials; lower success rates for plaintiffs by 
settlement and lower plaintiff win rates at pretrial adjudication and trial, 
especially judge trial; and more appeals. Maybe the situation has not 
gone from bad to worse in the last five years. But those plaintiffs may 
have gone from merely faring badly to feeling bad about their chances 
for success, which would affect their litigation behavior.9 
Professors Clermont and Schwab found that from 1998 to 2006, plaintiffs won 
10.88%  of Title VII cases, 9.12% of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cases, 
11.24% of § 1983 cases, 11.67% of Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) cases, 10.96% of § 1981 cases, and 19.55% of Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA) cases.10 From 1979 to 2006, plaintiffs won 15% of employment cases 
in federal district courts, whereas plaintiffs in other types of cases won 51% of the 
time.11 In cases resolved by pre-trial motions, plaintiffs in employment cases won 
only 3.59% of the time, compared to a plaintiff win rate in other cases of 21.05%.12 
The employment plaintiff win rate at trial was 28.47%, compared to a win rate of 
44.94% for plaintiffs in other types of cases.13 The difference in plaintiff win rates 
was particularly dramatic in bench trials, where the employment plaintiff win rate 
was only 19.62% versus plaintiffs in other cases who won 45.53% of the time.14 
When plaintiffs did win in the trial court, their victories were often fleeting. 
When defendants appealed plaintiff victories at trial, they secured reversals 41.10%  
of the time.15 In contrast, where defendants won at trial, plaintiffs secured reversals 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1254. 
 9. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131 (2009). 
 10. Id. at 116–17. 
 11. Id. at 127. 
 12. Id. at 128. 
 13. Id. at 129. 
 14. Id. at 130. 
 15. Id. at 110. 
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on appeal only 8.72% of the time.16 Professors Clermont and Schwab suggested 
that the dramatic success rate that defendants enjoyed in the courts of appeals may 
have made them more reluctant to settle cases. “Defendants may be marginally less 
willing to settle, early or at all, when they know they can get a favorable second 
chance in the courts of appeal should they lose at trial.”17 Regardless of the reasons, 
employment cases in federal court were significantly less likely to settle than other 
types of cases, with 37% of employment cases ending early in the litigation as 
opposed to 59% of other cases.18 
Litigation is a particularly inhospitable forum for claims of moderate value. A 
1995 survey of plaintiffs’ employment lawyers revealed that an employee required 
a minimum of $60,000 in damages, not including consequential or punitive 
damages, for the case to be worthwhile to a lawyer to litigate.19 A fall 2010 update 
suggests that accounting for inflation, the current minimum amount would be 
$84,000, which contrasts with the average $14,000 economic loss for employees 
who lose their jobs.20 The inhospitable nature of litigation toward claims of modest 
value has not been lost on the courts. For example, in Gentry v. Superior Court,21 
the California Supreme Court held that a class action waiver contained in an 
arbitration agreement was invalid under state law because it effectively exculpated 
the employer from liability under state wage and hour laws because wage and hour 
awards tended to be modest, particularly in light of the practical difficulties and 
length of time involved in adjudicating them.22 However, unlike systematic wage 
and hour claims, most claims of modest value are not likely to lend themselves to 
class action treatment. 
B. Arbitration 
A number of studies have compared how employees fare in arbitration versus 
litigation. They have examined employee win rates and amounts recovered. Almost 
all of the early studies focused on outcomes in employment arbitrations 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 124. 
 18. Id. at 122. Some state courts might provide a more hospitable forum for certain 
types of wrongful discharge claims. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An 
Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury 
Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 
535–49 (2003) (finding much higher plaintiff win rates in jury verdicts in California state 
courts, particularly in sexual harassment cases, but also finding that state court win rates 
were significantly lower for racial discrimination cases brought by African Americans and 
for discrimination claims brought by black women). 
 19. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What 
Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.–Dec. 1995, at 40, 
44−45. 
 20. Brief for National Workrights Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
12–13, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-839). 
 21. 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007). 
 22. See id. at 563–64. Gentry’s holding is likely no longer valid in light of AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA).23 These studies 
engendered debates over their methodologies24 as is often the case with empirical 
studies. Regardless of the merits of their methodology, however, a key drawback of 
these studies is that they all relied on data from arbitrations decided prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.25 Prior to that 
decision, the lower courts were divided over whether section 1 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), which excludes “contracts of employment of seamen, 
railroad employees or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce,”26 excluded most employment contracts from FAA coverage. In Circuit 
City, the Court interpreted the exclusion narrowly to apply only to employees in 
interstate transportation.27 The uncertainty in this area of the law inhibited many 
employers from imposing pre-dispute arbitration mandates on their employees. The 
Court’s decision in Circuit City undoubtedly led to a significant increase in the use 
of pre-dispute arbitration mandates.  
More recent empirical analysis comes primarily from Alexander Colvin.28 
Professor Colvin has analyzed data filed by AAA as required by the California 
Code of Civil Procedure that reflects all arbitrations under employer-imposed 
arbitration plans administered by AAA nationwide. He initially reported his 
findings at a national conference sponsored by the National Academy of 
Arbitrators, “Beyond the Protocol: The Future of Due Process in Workplace 
Dispute Resolution,” (“NAA Due Process Conference”) held in April 2007.29 He 
updated his research in a paper published in 2011.30 His results appear to confirm 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and 
Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–
Jan. 2004, at 44; Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of 
Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 777 (2003); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment 
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998). The major exception 
was Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitration of 
Employment Disputes: Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, 6 A.B.A. 
CONFLICT MGMT. 1 (2003), which used data from the New York Stock Exchange and 
National Association of Securities Dealers. 
 24. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1287−1307 (critiquing the earlier studies, 
particularly Eisenberg & Hill); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to 
Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 843, 848−58 (2008) (detailing methodological shortcomings of empirical 
studies on employment arbitration). 
 25. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 26. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 27. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115–19. 
 28. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: 
Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Colvin, 
Case Outcomes]; Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: 
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405 (2007) [hereinafter 
Colvin, Empirical Research]. 
 29. Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 28. 
 30. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 28. 
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some of the presumed favorable characteristics of employment arbitration while 
raising intriguing questions about others. 
One of the most often repeated presumed advantages of arbitration is its relative 
speed compared to litigation. The early studies of employment arbitration seemed 
to support this belief.31 Professor Colvin’s work confirmed the speed advantage of 
arbitration. He found that the mean time to resolve a case that proceeded to hearing 
and award was approximately one year;32 in contrast, litigation takes at least twice 
as long.33 Moreover, simply comparing time from filing of the claim to a decision 
by the adjudicator may understate the speed advantage of arbitration, particularly in 
cases in which the employee prevails. Given that employers who lose in federal 
district courts win on appeal almost half the time, one can reasonably expect that a 
victorious plaintiff will be met with a notice of appeal. In contrast, the grounds for 
judicial review of arbitration awards are extremely narrow.34 
A second characteristic urged by arbitration proponents is its greater 
accessibility relative to litigation, especially for lower income claimants and lower 
value claims. Professor Colvin’s work provides support for this claim. In his 2011 
paper, which analyzed all AAA administered cases under employer-imposed plans 
from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2007, Professor Colvin found that 
82.4% of the claimants for whom such information was available had salaries under 
$100,000.35 The median amount claimed was $106,151,36 and 25% of the claims 
were for $36,000 or less,37 with 10% for $10,000 or less.38 This compares very 
favorably to estimates that an employment claim must involve economic damages 
alone, that is, not including consequential or punitive damages, of at least $60,000–
$84,000 to be worth litigating.39 AAA rules go a long way to ensuring accessibility 
by providing that, except for a modest filing fee paid by the employee, all costs 
including AAA fees and arbitrator fees must be paid by the employer.40 Thus, it is 
not surprising that Professor Colvin found that employers paid 100% of arbitration 
fees 97% of the time.41 
Earlier studies found employee success rates in arbitration that were comparable 
to or better than employee success rates in litigation. Professor Colvin’s analysis of 
AAA data shows considerably lower employee success rates. In particular, he 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 23, at 51; Hill, supra note 23, at 822; Maltby, 
supra note 23, at 55. 
 32. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 28, at 8 (361.5 days); Colvin, Empirical 
Research, supra note 28, at 426 (332 days). 
 33. See Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 28, at 426; Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 
23, at 51 tbl.3. 
 34. See Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008) (discussing 
some courts’ willingness to review arbitral legal conclusions for manifest disregard of the 
law). 
 35. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 28, at 10−11 tbl.2. 
 36. Id. at 10. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 40. Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures: Costs of Employment 
Arbitration, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904#cost. 
 41. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 28, at 9. 
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found that in the period January 1, 2003, through December 31, 2007, employees 
won 21.4% of the cases that proceeded to arbitral award.42 Professor Colvin 
compared this to other researchers’ estimates of employee success rates in litigation 
and concluded that there is an “arbitration-litigation gap,” with employees faring 
less well in arbitration.43 On the other hand, even this low employee success rate in 
arbitration compares favorably to the employee success rates in federal court found 
by Professors Clermont and Schwab.44 Regardless of whether the arbitration gap 
exists, as Professor Colvin points out, considerable research is needed to determine 
what may account for that gap.  
There are many factors that may serve to depress the employee success rate in 
arbitrations that produce final awards relative to litigations that produce final 
judgments. Professor Colvin found that employee success rates varied with 
employee salaries. Employees with salaries below $100,000 won 22.7% of the 
time, those with salaries between $100,001 and $250,000 won 31.4% of the time, 
and those with salaries above $250,001 won 42.9% of the time.45 Employees with 
higher incomes will generally have claims that are worth more because of higher 
back pay amounts and will generally have greater resources to invest in their cases. 
Thus, it is not surprising that higher income employees have a greater success rate 
than their lower income counterparts. To the extent that arbitration is a more 
accessible forum for lower income employees, that accessibility might depress the 
employee win rate relative to litigation. 
Claims are also far less likely to be dismissed or adjudicated on summary 
judgment in arbitration than in litigation. At one time, it was thought that summary 
disposition was completely unavailable in arbitration. Noted plaintiffs’ attorney 
Paul Tobias touted arbitration because “[t]he employer can’t get summary 
judgment in arbitration. . . . The employee gets an absolute right to tell the story to 
a neutral party.”46 Although the absolute bar has been lifted, summary disposition 
remains relatively rare in arbitration. Under AAA Employment Arbitration Rules, a 
party must obtain leave from the arbitrator to even file a dispositive motion. The 
rules provide that for the arbitrator to allow the filing there must be a showing of 
“substantial cause that the motion is likely to succeed and dispose of or narrow the 
issues in the case.”47 If arbitration weeds out fewer weak claims through dispositive 
motions than litigation does, we would expect the claimant success rate following 
hearing to be lower. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Id. at 5–6. 
 43. Id. at 6. 
 44. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 45. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 28, at 10. Note that all of these figures exceed 
the overall 21.4% employee win rate. I assume that this is because employee salary data was 
missing from a substantial number of cases in Professor Colvin’s data set, and thus his 
analysis based on employee income level could not consider every case that he considered in 
calculating overall employee win rate. 
 46. Paul Tobias, Proceedings of the 1997 Annual Meeting Association of American Law 
School Sections on Employment Discrimination Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 269, 283 (1997). 
 47. Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures: Rule 27, AM. ARB. ASS’N 
(2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904#27. 
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Professor Colvin’s 2007 paper reported that in 25.1% of the arbitration cases, 
employees proceeded pro se.48 Not surprisingly, the win rate for employees 
represented by counsel was significantly higher than the win rate for those who 
represented themselves.49 To the extent that arbitration is more amenable to self-
representation than litigation, this too may depress relative employee success rates. 
Another factor that may depress employee success rates in arbitrations that go to 
award arises from the way in which many employers use arbitration. Many 
employers incorporate arbitration as a final step in a multi-step employee dispute 
resolution process. Many require mediation prior to resorting to arbitration and 
many provide incentives for resolution at the mediation stage. To the extent that 
such dispute resolution systems encourage settlement, it may be that the claims that 
proceed to arbitral hearing are, as a group, weaker than the claims that proceed to 
trial in court.  
Ultimately, however, whether an arbitration-litigation gap exists and the reasons 
for such a gap are not particularly relevant to questions of statutory reform. Even if 
we assume the existence of a gap that can be attributed to employer abuses, before 
we decide to prohibit all pre-dispute arbitration mandates, we need to ask whether 
there is anything worth preserving in employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration 
mandates and, if so, how to preserve it. With this inquiry in mind, I turn to the 
question of why employers impose such mandates on their employees. 
II. WHY DO EMPLOYERS IMPOSE ARBITRATION? 
As previously noted, AFA supporters infer that employment arbitration likely 
tilts the playing field to the advantage of employers because only plaintiffs seek to 
avoid it and only employers seek to enforce employer-imposed pre-dispute 
arbitration mandates.50 Although this makes for good rhetoric, when more closely 
scrutinized the argument lacks substance. It is true that the reporters are filled with 
cases where employee-plaintiffs sought to litigate and employer-defendants moved 
to dismiss or compel arbitration. It is also likely that reported cases where 
employers sought to litigate and employees sought to compel arbitration are non-
existent. Furthermore, many, perhaps most, plaintiffs’ attorneys are opposed to 
employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates. But these facts do not support 
an inference that employer-imposed arbitration tilts the playing field in favor of 
employers. 
It is not surprising that virtually all reported litigation consists of plaintiffs 
resisting defense efforts to compel arbitration. I would not expect to find anything 
else. If plaintiff’s counsel determines that it is strategically better to be in court 
rather than before an arbitrator, counsel will file suit and resist arbitration. If 
defense counsel shares plaintiff’s counsel’s preference for litigation, defense 
counsel will not move to compel arbitration and the matter will proceed in court. A 
court has no authority to compel arbitration sua sponte. If defense counsel, 
however, considers it strategically better to arbitrate, counsel will move to compel 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 28, at 432. 
 49. Id. at 433. 
 50. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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arbitration. What the reported cases do not tell us is how often employees’ counsel 
simply file arbitration demands. 
Of course if we had data on how often employees’ counsel file arbitration 
demands, the data would not lend itself to any inference. What we would not know 
is how often counsel filed the demand after determining that arbitrating was in the 
employee’s interest and how often counsel filed the demand because, as the law has 
developed, resisting arbitration would not likely be successful. We simply cannot 
draw any inferences from the conduct of parties in litigation or otherwise. 
AFA proponents point to the position of the plaintiffs’ bar. I will assume that the 
plaintiffs’ employment bar is unified in its opposition to employer-imposed 
pre-dispute arbitration mandates, although there is no way to prove it. At most, this 
opposition shows that lawyers who represent employee-plaintiffs have concluded 
that employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates are not in the lawyers’ 
interests. No inference may be drawn that such plans are not in the interests of 
employees.  
Clyde Summers, after analyzing data from studies of wrongful discharge 
litigation in California, found that there was a large disparity in recovery among 
litigants. Even for litigants who received high jury verdicts, post-trial appeals and 
settlements substantially reduced final payments, and attorney contingency fees and 
reimbursement of litigation costs reduced the employee’s net recovery even 
further.51 Professor Summers found that most wrongfully discharged employees 
received modest or inadequate awards, often little more than half their economic 
losses, and had to wait three to five years after their discharges for any recovery.52 
He further found that the wide disparity in awards bore little resemblance to the 
plaintiffs’ economic losses.53 He concluded that the litigation system resulted in “a 
lottery in which many receive nothing, most receive less than their economic loss, 
while a lucky few win the jackpot.”54 
We know that plaintiffs’ attorneys carefully screen employment cases and reject 
the overwhelming majority of cases that come their way.55 They have to do so to 
maximize the likelihood that the cases they pick will win the lottery. Prohibiting 
pre-dispute arbitration mandates in employment may very well be in the interests of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys who can cherry pick the best and most valuable cases and who 
can aim, over a wide spectrum of cases, to settle most, lose some, and win the 
lottery enough times to make it worthwhile; but the plaintiffs’ bar’s support for the 
AFA says nothing about whether the AFA is in the best interests of employees 
generally, particularly those whose claims or resources preclude their securing 
counsel.  
On the other hand, if imposing pre-dispute arbitration mandates so thoroughly 
advantages employers as AFA proponents contend, we would expect to find a large 
majority of employers adopting such plans. But the evidence is clear that this has 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines 
and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 464–65 (1992). 
 52. Id. at 466. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 6, at 790−91. 
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not occurred. Professor Colvin estimated that 15–25% of employers imposed 
arbitration mandates.56 Professor St. Antoine reported: 
At a recent meeting of labor and employment lawyers in Michigan, I 
could not find a single top management attorney who was currently 
advising clients to start or retain a mandatory arbitration system. Three 
reasons were given: Employees win too often; it is hard to get summary 
judgment in arbitration; and full appellate review is not available.57 
Citing, among other things, the absence of appeals and the rarity of dismissals or 
summary judgments in arbitration, the senior counsel of Raytheon Company 
reported that his company had discontinued its imposed pre-dispute arbitration 
mandate.58 
Sophisticated plaintiffs’ class counsel have recognized the advantages of 
arbitration for individual claims that may not be of high value and may be brought 
by pro se claimants. In the famous Shakman cases against patronage hiring 
practices by the City of Chicago and Cook County, the most recent Agreed 
Settlement Order and Accord in the city case provides for post-Accord claimants to 
submit their claims of unlawful political discrimination in employment to the city’s 
Inspector General’s Office, which investigates and sustains or does not sustain the 
claim.59 In either case, the inspector general notifies the claimant of the finding and 
his or her right to demand arbitration before one of ten arbitrators appointed by the 
court.60 The arbitrator conducts the proceedings in accordance with AAA 
Employment Arbitration Rules and renders a decision that is final.61 A consent 
decree in the litigation with Cook County contains similar provisions.62 Although 
claimants retain their right to bypass the inspector general and arbitration processes 
and file suit in federal court, the expectation is that most will not do so given that 
many will appear pro se and the monetary values of their claims will not be high 
enough to justify litigating.  
Evidence concerning employer motivation for imposing pre-dispute arbitration 
mandates presents a mixed picture. Employers are more likely to mandate 
arbitration following their own encounters with the litigation system.63 Usually, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 28, at 411. 
 57. St. Antoine, ADR, supra note 6, at 421. 
 58. Charles D. Coleman, Is Mandatory Employment Arbitration Living Up to Its 
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 59. Agreed Settlement Order and Accord, Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook Cnty., 
No. 69 C 2145 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 60. Id. at 26–27. 
 61. Id. at 27–29. 
 62. Supplemental Relief Order for Cook County, Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook 
Cnty., No. 69 C 2145, at 24–26 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2006). 
 63. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-157, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS’ EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 8 (1997) [hereinafter 
GAO, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION]; Richard A. Bales & Jason N.W. Plowman, 
Compulsory Arbitration as Part of a Broader Employment Dispute Resolution Process: The 
Anheuser-Busch Example, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 10 (2008). 
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employers impose arbitration as the final step in a broader dispute resolution 
program. Their aim is to resolve employee claims quickly and relatively 
inexpensively. Indeed, speed and cost savings often go hand-in-hand. The faster a 
claim is resolved, the lower the employer’s attorney fees and the lower the 
exposure to back pay liability.64  
But significant abuses exist. The poster child for an abusive arbitration system 
was the one that Hooters imposed on its employees.65 The Hooters arbitration rules 
required the employee to state the nature of her claim and the specific acts or 
omissions on which the claim was based and to provide a list of witnesses with a 
summary of the facts known to each, but imposed no similar requirements on the 
employer.66 The rules restricted the supposedly neutral arbitrator to those on a list 
completely controlled by Hooters.67 Furthermore, the rules allowed Hooters to seek 
summary judgment, to record the hearing, and to sue to vacate the award if the 
arbitration panel exceeded its authority, but gave no similar rights to the 
employee.68 Lastly, the rules allowed the employer to amend them at any time 
without notice to the employee and allowed the company, but not the employee, to 
cancel the agreement to arbitrate by giving thirty days’ notice.69 
The arbitration-happy Fourth Circuit characterized the system that Hooters 
established as “a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration.”70 It 
concluded that Hooters had breached its duty to establish a fair and impartial 
system and ordered the agreement to arbitrate rescinded.71 
Employers need not go as far as Hooters did to impose pre-dispute arbitration 
mandates on their employees that tilt the playing field to the employer’s advantage. 
One way to tilt the playing field is to include in the arbitration provision a 
prohibition on maintaining a class action or even a consolidated action, leaving any 
employee to bring the case as an individual claim. Such abusive provisions are 
prevalent in certain consumer contracts. For example, Theodore Eisenberg, 
Geoffrey Miller, and Emily Sherwin examined the contracts of leading companies 
in the telecommunications, financial services, and credit industries.72 They 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. For example, Professors Sherwyn, Estreicher, and Heise studied one company that 
imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates on its employees as the final step in a multi-step 
dispute resolution process. They found that most claims were resolved in the earlier steps of 
the process, that most claimants remained employed by the company even after the dispute 
was resolved, and that the company was able to cut its attorney fees in half. David Sherwyn, 
Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New 
Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1581−89 (2005). For other examples, 
see GAO, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 63; Bales & Plowman, supra note 
63; Michael Z. Green, Ethical Incentives for Employers in Adopting Legal Service Plans to 
Handle Employment Disputes, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 395, 409−10 (2006). 
 65. See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 66. Id. at 938. 
 67. Id. at 938−39. 
 68. Id. at 939. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 940. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer 
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer 
300 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:289 
 
 
compared the companies’ consumer, employment, and material contracts and found 
that 76.9% of the companies’ consumer contracts and 92.9% of their employment 
contracts mandated arbitration, but only 23.7% of their materials contracts, that is, 
the contracts with other businesses, did so.73 All of the consumer contracts with 
arbitration provisions also prohibited class action arbitrations and 80% prohibited 
all class actions.74 In contrast, none of the consumer contracts without arbitration 
mandates prohibited class actions.75 A study by the Searle Civil Justice Institute of 
AAA consumer arbitrations found that every arbitration agreement involving cell 
phone services and credit cards prohibited class actions.76 In these contracts, 
consumer claims are likely to be of extremely low value and simply will not be 
pursued without the ability to bring class actions. Professors Eisenberg, Miller, and 
Sherwin concluded that the companies imposed arbitration agreements as a vehicle 
for precluding class actions.77  
Interestingly, Eisenberg and his colleagues found that although employment pre-
dispute arbitration mandates were almost universal among the companies they 
studied, none of the companies prohibited class actions.78 Nevertheless, there is 
considerable evidence that some employers impose arbitration mandates as a 
vehicle for prohibiting class actions.79 Although the percentage of employment 
claims that are too low value to be worth litigating or arbitrating other than on a 
class-wide basis is undoubtedly much lower than for claims arising out of cell 
phones and credit cards, there are many employment claims that fall into this 
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ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION PRELIMINARY REPORT 103 (2009). 
 77. Eisenberg et al., supra note 72, at 888−92. 
 78. Id. at 884, tbl.3. 
 79. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and 
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 
427 & n.121 (2006). Sometimes these provisions may backfire on employers. I presided over 
an arbitration administered by AAA that was initially brought as a class action in state court. 
The court enforced the arbitration provision and class action waiver in the employment 
contract and compelled the employee to arbitrate on an individual basis. Over the next few 
months approximately forty other individuals filed similar arbitration demands. All were 
represented by the same law firm who represented the first claimant. They were assigned to 
different arbitrators. In case management conferences, defense counsel complained 
frequently of duplicative discovery demands made in the cases and of claimants’ counsel 
noticing the same managers for deposition in every case. Moreover, under AAA rules, in 
arbitrations under employer-promulgated plans, the employer pays all costs except for a 
nominal filing fee paid by the employee. AAA requires employers to deposit an amount 
equal to the arbitrator’s estimate of his or her fee in the event the case proceeds to hearing 
and award. Arbitrators tend to estimate on the high side to ensure that the deposits will not 
fall short of the entire fee. I do not know what other arbitrators required but using my own 
required deposit as a guide, it is quite likely that the employer was required to deposit more 
than $500,000 in up front arbitrator fees to cover the forty cases. A global settlement of all 
cases was reached. Although I cannot know this for a fact, it seems reasonable to me that the 
claimants had considerable leverage in settlement precisely because each case was 
proceeding as an individual arbitration with the employer paying all arbitration fees. 
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category.80 Moreover, there is simply no reason for a class action waiver other than 
to insulate an employer from liability for breaches of its statutory or common law 
duties. The incorporation of class action waivers is a clear abuse of 
employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates. 
Two other provisions that can only be characterized as abuses of 
employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates are those that limit remedies 
and that reduce the limitations period for bringing a claim. Neither one serves any 
purpose other than to tilt the playing field to the employer’s advantage. They 
preclude claims that could have proceeded in court because they were filed within 
the statutory limitations period but outside the contractual limitations period.81 
One provision that could have legitimate justifications but has come to be 
regarded as an abusive provision requires the parties to share equally the costs of 
the arbitration, including the arbitrator’s fees. At one time, it was thought that fee 
sharing was important to ensure arbitral impartiality and the Due Process Protocol 
for employment arbitration provided for such fee splitting for this reason.82 
However, it has come to be recognized that fee-splitting provisions can actually 
serve to render the arbitral forum inhospitable to employee claims. Billing rates for 
employment arbitration tend to be considerably higher than billing rates for labor, 
that is, union-management, arbitration.83 Furthermore, most employment arbitrators 
require payment up front of the estimated total fee for the proceeding. 
Consequently, requiring employees to be responsible for an equal share of the 
arbitrator’s fees can deter the bringing of claims.84 On the other hand, it has also 
been recognized that most arbitrators will not care who is paying them, only that 
they are being paid, and thus providing for the employer to absorb the full costs of 
the arbitration proceeding does not endanger arbitrator impartiality.85 
There is an acute need to police against abusive provisions in employer-imposed 
pre-dispute arbitration mandates because it is the employer that unilaterally drafts 
the provisions. Unfortunately, as demonstrated in the next Part, the courts have 
largely abdicated their policing responsibilities. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. See, e.g., Brief for National Workrights Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
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III. THE INADEQUACY OF JUDICIAL POLICING 
At the NAA Due Process Conference, I documented the failure of judicial 
policing of due process in employment arbitration and the need for self-regulation 
by the arbitration community.86 In this Part, I draw on and update that analysis. I 
find that the situation has only worsened in the intervening four years. Indeed, as 
developed below, the courts have gone beyond abdicating their policing 
responsibilities and have endangered the ability of the arbitral community to self-
regulate. 
There are two primary vehicles for judicial policing of abusive provisions in 
employer-imposed arbitration mandates: the requirement that the arbitral forum be 
one in which employees are able to vindicate their claims effectively, and the 
common law contract doctrine of unconscionability. The first has effectively failed, 
and the Supreme Court has recently dealt the second two blows that could turn out 
to be fatal. 
 In Cole v. Burns International Security Services,87 the D.C. Circuit seized the 
requirement that employees be able to vindicate their claims effectively in the 
arbitral forum as a mandate for courts to police the procedural fairness of the 
arbitration system. The court set forth guidelines against which it would measure an 
employer-imposed arbitration mandate, enforcing it only if it: 
(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal 
discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types 
of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not 
require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ 
fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.88 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has completely undermined judicial policing 
of employer-imposed arbitration mandates by placing a heavy burden on an 
employee resisting arbitration to prove in the employee’s individual case that the 
system impedes his or her ability to vindicate effectively the statutory claim in the 
arbitral forum and by deferring most such issues to the arbitrator for resolution. In 
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, the Court rejected Cole’s bright line 
requirement that the employer pay all arbitral fees except for a nominal filing fee 
and held, instead, that whether a requirement that a consumer (or employee) pay a 
percentage of the arbitrator’s fee impeded effective vindication of claims in the 
arbitral forum must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with the burden on the 
party resisting arbitration to prove the impediment.89   
A rule that requires employers to limit employees to paying only a nominal 
amount of forum costs if they want their arbitration agreements enforced is largely 
self-enforcing, as employers must provide in their plans for employees to pay only 
nominal fees. In contrast, Randolph effectively mandates pre-arbitration litigation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law and 
the Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 363 (2007). 
 87. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 88. Id. at 1482 (emphasis omitted). 
 89. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
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over fee allocation. The prospect of costly and uncertain litigation likely deters 
many claimants from challenging a plan’s allocation of arbitral fees, even where 
the prospect of being assessed large fees deters them from bringing their claims to 
arbitration.90 
In PacifiCare Health Systems v. Book, the Supreme Court began signaling lower 
courts to refer to arbitrators questions concerning the adequacy of an arbitral forum 
to vindicate statutory rights.91 In PacifiCare, the Court held that whether an 
arbitration clause precluding “punitive or exemplary damages” precluded treble 
damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 
and was thus unenforceable, was for the arbitrator to decide.92 It characterized the 
contracts’ limitations on the arbitrator’s remedial authority as “ambiguous” and 
reasoned, “[W]e should not, on the basis of ‘mere speculation’ that an arbitrator 
might interpret these ambiguous agreements in a manner that casts their 
enforceability into doubt, take upon ourselves the authority to decide the antecedent 
question of how the ambiguity is to be resolved.”93 The Court held that the lower 
courts should have compelled arbitration.94 
To resolve the issue of arbitral remedial authority, the arbitrator will, of 
necessity, have to decide whether RICO treble damages are punitive or 
compensatory. Significantly, the Court did not hold in PacifiCare that RICO treble 
damages are not punitive in nature. It merely observed that, in prior decisions, it 
had characterized various statutory treble damage provisions as serving remedial as 
well as punitive functions.95 Thus, the Court left it to the arbitrator in PacifiCare to 
interpret RICO in the context of the arbitration agreements’ limitations on arbitral 
remedial authority. Furthermore, if the arbitrator determined that the agreement 
precluded an award of treble damages, the arbitrator would have to decide whether 
such a prospective waiver of treble damages is allowed under RICO. 
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the Supreme Court held that the 
question of whether a contract containing an arbitration clause was void under state 
law was an issue for the arbitrator and not the court.96 Almost forty years earlier, in 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the Court held that 
issues of fraud in the inducement of the contract were issues for the arbitrator, in 
contrast to issues of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause, which were 
issues for the court.97 The Court in Buckeye Check Cashing concluded that Prima 
Paint controlled the issue before it and rejected the distinction established in 
contract law between void and voidable contracts as irrelevant, interpreting the 
word “contract,” as used in section two of the FAA to include contracts that are 
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later held to be void.98 Thus, the Court again deferred interpretation and application 
of the public law to the privately selected and privately accountable arbitrator. 
Most recently, in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Court held that 
whether an arbitration clause was unconscionable was a decision for the arbitrator 
where the arbitration agreement provided for arbitral resolution of that issue.99 As a 
condition of employment, Jackson agreed to arbitrate all claims arising out of his 
employment. The arbitration agreement further provided, “The Arbitrator, and not 
any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve 
any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation 
of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this 
Agreement is void or voidable.”100 Jackson maintained that the agreement to 
arbitrate was unconscionable, and Rent-a-Center sought to compel arbitration of the 
unconscionability issue.101 
The Court applied Prima Paint in a most peculiar manner. The Court considered 
the provision delegating issues of enforcement of the arbitration clause as a 
separate provision from the provision that the plaintiff would arbitrate all claims 
arising out of his employment. The Court read Prima Paint to mean that issues of 
unconscionability of the agreement to arbitrate all claims arising out of the 
employment relationship were arbitrable; only issues of unconscionability of the 
agreement to arbitrate the validity of the clause that provided for arbitral resolution 
of the unconscionability issue were for judicial resolution.102 
The issue the Court held arbitrable in Rent-a-Center, however, was very 
different from the issue the Court held arbitrable in Prima Paint, or even from the 
issue the Court held arbitrable in Buckeye Check Cashing. In Prima Paint, the issue 
held arbitrable was whether the contract as a whole was voidable because it was 
fraudulently induced.103 The voidability of the contract goes to the merits of the 
underlying action on the contract; it does not go to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. In 
this regard, a claim that the contract as a whole is void is similar to a claim that it is 
voidable. 
In contrast, because an arbitrator’s authority derives from the parties’ agreement 
to arbitrate, an allegation that the arbitration clause, as opposed to the contract as a 
whole, is voidable goes to the arbitrator’s authority to act at all. The arbitrator has 
an interest in finding the arbitration clause valid because a finding that the 
arbitration clause is not valid defeats the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and ensures that 
the arbitrator will earn a fee limited to ruling on the threshold jurisdictional issue. 
In other words, the arbitrator will earn no fee for adjudicating the merits of the 
underlying dispute. Submitting a matter to an adjudicator who has such a personal 
financial interest in the resolution of the issue is a basic denial of due process.104 
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The Court’s decision in Rent-a-Center may be the high water mark of the Court’s 
deferral of critical threshold issues of public law and procedural fairness to 
arbitrators and its abdication of judicial responsibility for policing the arbitral 
process to ensure that arbitration is a forum in which claimants may effectively 
vindicate statutory claims. 
The message of these recent Supreme Court decisions to the lower courts is 
clear. They are to avoid deciding most issues concerning the validity of the 
arbitration provision and instead refer those issues to the arbitrator. Furthermore, 
whether the apparent impediments in the arbitration provision will deny the 
plaintiff a forum in which to effectively vindicate his or her statutory rights is 
speculative until the arbitrator rules. Consequently, under Randolph, the plaintiff 
cannot sustain the burden of proof on this issue. This message was not lost on then 
Circuit Judge, now Chief Justice, Roberts who, considering Randolph and 
PacifiCare, opined: 
We take from these recent cases two basic propositions: first, that the 
party resisting arbitration on the ground that the terms of an arbitration 
agreement interfere with the effective vindication of statutory rights 
bears the burden of showing the likelihood of such interference, and 
second, that this burden cannot be carried by “mere speculation” about 
how an arbitrator “might” interpret or apply the agreement.105 
At common law, adjudicators have the authority to deny enforcement of 
contracts and contract provisions that are illegal or contrary to public policy.106 The 
Supreme Court has recognized, in the context of labor arbitration, that an arbitrator 
also has such authority.107 Consequently, taken to its logical extreme, the Court’s 
most recent arbitration jurisprudence suggests that a court should not rule on even 
the most patently illegal characteristics of the arbitration agreement because it is 
“mere speculation” whether the arbitrator will enforce or strike them. The Eighth 
Circuit has come close to this approach. In Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co.,108 
the district court refused to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs’ claims under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),109 because the arbitration agreement imposed 
“procedural terms and remedial limitations [that] appear to be facially inconsistent 
with the FLSA statutory claims . . . .”110 The Eighth Circuit chided the district court 
for reflecting “outmoded judicial hostility to arbitration that the Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected in construing the FAA.”111 The court held that the validity of 
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the contractual limitations was for the arbitrator to decide, reasoning, “When an 
agreement to arbitrate encompasses statutory claims, the arbitrator has the authority 
to enforce substantive statutory rights, even if those rights are in conflict with 
contractual limitations in the agreement that would otherwise apply.”112 The Eighth 
and Eleventh Circuits have refused to invalidate contractual provisions limiting the 
statutory right of a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney fees, reasoning that how 
the arbitrator will adjudicate the issue is too speculative to justify the conclusion 
that arbitration will not allow plaintiffs to vindicate effectively their statutory 
rights.113 Some courts have deferred the validity of shortened limitations provisions 
to the arbitrator.114 Under this approach, about the only issue that a court might 
consider policing is control over selection of the arbitrator.115 
Against this background, the Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
Animalfeeds International Corp.116 sticks out like a sore thumb. In Stolt-Nielsen, a 
shipper’s contract with shipping companies required arbitration of the shipper’s 
claims. The shipper, Animalfeeds, served the shipping companies with a demand 
for class action arbitration of claimed antitrust violations. The parties stipulated that 
their contract was silent as to class arbitration, which Animalfeeds represented to 
mean that no agreement had been reached on the issue.117 The parties agreed to 
submit the issue to a panel of arbitrators that issued a finding that the matter could 
proceed as a class action arbitration.118 The Supreme Court, however, did not defer 
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to the arbitrators’ ruling. Rather, the Court interpreted the FAA as containing a 
presumption against class-action arbitration. The Court reasoned that “class-action 
arbitration chang[ed] the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be 
presumed [that] the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their 
disputes to an arbitrator.”119 Although generally a court reviewing an arbitration 
award must enforce it as long as the award is arguably based on the contract and as 
long as there is any rationale supporting the award,120 the Court chose to ignore 
references in the award to the intent of the parties and concluded that there was 
only one possible enforceable outcome—denial of class-action arbitration.121 Even 
though the Court has generally swept issues of public law to arbitrators for 
resolution, in the one case before it where the arbitrators determined that a 
particular procedure (class-action arbitration) was appropriate for enforcing 
effectively statutory rights, the Court held that the determination was beyond the 
arbitrators’ authority.122 
The Supreme Court has made mincemeat of the rationale that arbitration merely 
shifts the forum for adjudication and does not waive underlying substantive rights 
as long as the claimant can effectively vindicate the claims in arbitration as a tool 
for policing employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates. But what of the 
state law contracts doctrine of unconscionability? In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. 
Casarotto, the Supreme Court drew a line between “[g]enerally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, [which] may be applied to 
invalidate arbitration agreements,” and “state laws applicable only to arbitration 
provisions,”123 which may not because they are preempted by the FAA.124
 Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc.125 illustrates how powerful a policing tool 
the doctrine of unconscionability can be. Brewer brought a class action alleging 
violations of numerous Missouri consumer protection statutes.126 Her loan 
agreement with Missouri Title contained arbitration and class action waiver 
provisions.127 The trial court held the class action waiver unconscionable, severed 
it, and ordered the matter to arbitration to determine whether it was suitable for 
class arbitration.128 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the 
class action waiver was unconscionable because Brewer had no opportunity to 
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negotiate over it and because the claims were so small that they could not 
practically be brought individually.129 But the court read Stolt-Nielsen to preclude it 
from simply severing the unconscionable class action waiver because Title Loan 
had manifested its objection to arbitrating on a class basis. Consequently, in the 
court’s view, its only option and the one it pursued was to strike the entire 
arbitration agreement as unconscionable.130 
At the NAA Due Process Conference, I highlighted several drawbacks to 
reliance on the doctrine of unconscionability to police employer-imposed 
pre-dispute arbitration mandates. These include the wide variation among the 
jurisdictions in applying the doctrine, the ability to use choice of law clauses to 
avoid application of the law of jurisdictions that take a liberal approach to 
unconscionability, and the need to navigate a minefield of potential FAA 
preemptions of state unconscionability law.131 Since then, the Court has dealt two 
blows to the unconscionability doctrine that could turn out to be fatal. 
As previously discussed, the Court’s decision in Rent-a-Center allows an 
employer to avoid judicial determination of the unconscionability issue completely 
by inserting a clause providing for arbitral resolution.132 More recently, in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA preempted the 
application of California’s unconscionability doctrine to a provision in an 
arbitration mandate that prohibited class actions.133 
The Concepcions brought a class action alleging false advertising and fraud 
when AT&T charged them sales tax on the retail value of phones that it had 
advertised as free.134 The arbitration agreement that AT&T imposed on all of its 
customers required arbitration on an individual basis.135 Under California law, such 
prohibitions on class actions, whether coupled with arbitration provisions or free 
standing, were unconscionable in contracts of adhesion involving predictably small 
amounts of damages.136 The Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not preempt 
California law because the California rule applied to contracts generally, not just to 
contracts for arbitration.137 The Supreme Court reversed. 
Although the FAA permits holding arbitration agreements unenforceable on 
“such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”138 the 
Court declared that a primary purpose of the FAA is to enforce arbitration 
agreements in accordance with their own terms.139 It further maintained, “Requiring 
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the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of 
arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”140 
The Court considered arbitration to be a forum poorly suited to class actions. In 
the Court’s view, class actions in arbitration would make confidentiality more 
difficult.141 The Court was skeptical that arbitrators would have sufficient expertise 
to safeguard the rights of absent class members.142 The Court further found it “odd 
to think that an arbitrator would be entrusted with ensuring that third parties’ due 
process rights are satisfied.”143 It urged that “[t]he absence of multilayered review” 
made arbitration a poor forum for class actions.144 The Court continued: 
Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation. In 
litigation, a defendant may appeal a certification decision on an 
interlocutory basis and, if unsuccessful, may appeal from a final 
judgment as well. Questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions 
of fact for clear error. In contrast, 9 U.S.C. § 10 allows a court to vacate 
an arbitral award only where the award “was procured by corruption, 
fraud, or undue means”; “there was evident partiality or corruption in 
the arbitrators”; “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing 
to postpone the hearing . . . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy[,] or of any other misbehavior by which the 
rights of any party have been prejudiced”; or if the “arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, 
final, and definite award . . . was not made.” . . . [R]eview under § 10 
focuses on misconduct rather than mistake. And parties may not 
contractually expand the grounds or nature of judicial review. We find 
it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no 
effective means of review, and even harder to believe that Congress 
would have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.145 
The Court’s analysis is remarkably similar to its analysis of arbitration in 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., where the Court held that an employee who 
arbitrated his discharge grievance under a collective bargaining agreement was not 
precluded from litigating the same discharge under Title VII.146 The Court 
reasoned, in part, that the arbitral forum was poorly suited for resolving Title VII 
claims. It opined that arbitrators lacked the expertise necessary to interpret and 
apply Title VII,147 and that arbitration procedures were too informal for the 
adjudication of statutory claims.148 But the Court has since derided Gardner-
Denver as reflecting now-discredited judicial hostility toward arbitration.149 That 
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arbitrators lack the expertise of judges and that arbitration is an informal process is 
no longer a basis for preventing adjudication of statutory rights in the arbitral forum 
but it is a basis for preventing class-wide arbitration. Hostility, it appears, is in the 
eyes of the beholder. 
The FAA does not expressly define “arbitration.” The Court has taken it upon 
itself to craft a vision of arbitration and attribute that vision to the Congress that 
enacted the FAA. The Court’s vision can now be manipulated to render state 
contract law impotent in policing employer-imposed arbitration mandates. For 
example, consider an employer-imposed arbitration mandate that drastically limits 
discovery.150 Under state contract law, such an agreement might be considered 
unconscionable. Yet, under AT&T Mobility, the FAA’s command that arbitration 
agreements be enforced according to their terms coupled with the Court’s view that 
envisions arbitration as an informal, fast, and inexpensive method of dispute 
resolution could lead the Court to hold such state law preempted.151 
At the NAA Due Process Conference, I called for increased self-regulation as a 
partial antidote to judicial abdication of the policing role.152 I recognized the 
limitations of self-regulation but suggested that because the arbitration service 
providers with the largest shares of the employment arbitration market, AAA and 
JAMS, had adopted numerous due process protections and because AAA, notably, 
provided that where there was a conflict between its rules and the arbitration 
agreement the AAA rules would govern, self-regulation could go a long way to 
filling the need for due process protections.153 I specifically noted that AAA and 
JAMS continue to require employers to pay all arbitration costs outside of a 
nominal filing fee in spite of the Court’s decision in Randolph as an example of 
what self-regulation could accomplish.154 I called for further self-regulation, 
including a refusal to enforce class action waivers and an insistence that arbitration 
provisions not reduce limitations periods.155 Similarly, the NAA has issued 
guidelines for arbitrators to use in determining whether to accept an appointment in 
an employment case.156 
Unfortunately, a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals threatens to 
undermine such self-regulation completely. In Brady v. Williams Capital Group, 
L.P., Williams imposed on its employees a requirement that they arbitrate their 
claims arising out of their employment in accordance with AAA rules “except as 
provided in this Agreement.”157 The arbitration agreement further provided that the 
employee and Williams share equally the arbitrator’s fee.158  
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Brady filed an arbitration demand with AAA over Williams’s termination of her 
employment. AAA determined that the demand was filed under an employer-
promulgated plan, that Williams was responsible for the entire arbitrator’s fee, and 
invoiced Williams for a deposit of $42,300 to cover the arbitrator’s anticipated 
fee.159 When Williams repeatedly refused to pay, insisting that Brady pay half, 
AAA cancelled the arbitration.160 Brady sued to compel Williams to pay or for the 
entry of a default judgment against Williams, but the court held that the provision 
in the arbitration agreement adopting AAA rules except as otherwise provided in 
the Agreement required Brady to pay half of the arbitrator’s fee despite AAA rules 
to the contrary.161 Consequently, the court held, under Randolph, Brady had the 
burden to prove that the requirement that she pay half of the arbitrator’s fee 
precluded her from arbitrating the case.162  
If Brady is followed in other jurisdictions, employers can avoid due process 
guarantees required by arbitration service providers such as AAA by simply 
inserting “except as otherwise provided in this agreement” language into their pre-
dispute arbitration mandates. Then they can provide in their agreements for fee 
sharing, limitations on remedies, shortened limitations periods, limitations on 
discovery, and other provisions that tilt the playing field to their advantage. The 
only option for the arbitration service provider is to refuse to administer the 
arbitration, and there is evidence that AAA does refuse to administer arbitrations 
where a party does not comply with AAA required due process protections.163 
Unfortunately, that is not likely to prevent arbitration under the employer’s terms. 
There is evidence that where AAA has refused to administer consumer arbitrations 
due to protocol violations, the merchant took the case to the National Arbitration 
Forum, which administered it.164 Some courts have still compelled arbitration even 
though the designated arbitration provider had refused to administer the case on 
due process grounds.165  
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 
The abdication by courts of their policing responsibilities and the inadequacy of 
a system of self-regulation leads to the inescapable conclusion that legislative 
reform is needed to curb employer abuses of pre-dispute arbitration mandates that 
they impose on their employees. Congress should amend the FAA not by 
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prohibiting all pre-dispute arbitration provisions in employment contracts but by 
prohibiting those provisions that do not ensure basic due process. Such assurances 
include that the employee may be represented by counsel of his or her choice, that 
the arbitration demand may be filed at any time within the applicable statute of 
limitations, that the arbitrator have authority to order such discovery as is necessary 
to ensure a full and fair proceeding, and that the arbitrator have authority to award 
any remedy that a court could order. 
Beyond these obvious due process guarantees, statutory reform should focus on 
the arbitrator appointing agencies and the arbitrator selection process. The 
employer unilaterally selects the arbitrator appointing agency when it designs the 
arbitration system. An employer who mandates arbitration under AAA rules, for 
example, has unilaterally selected AAA as its arbitrator appointing agency. 
The enormous importance of the identity and impartiality of the arbitrator 
appointing agency is obvious. AAA and other arbitration service providers actively 
market their services to employers. The desire to attract and retain employer 
business can have a negative effect on the way in which the arbitration appointing 
agency administers the arbitration system. For example, in the early development 
of the AAA Employment Disputes Panel, employers believed that labor arbitrators 
would favor employees and expressed strong preferences for excluding them from 
the panel. The initial AAA Employment Disputes Panel excluded most labor 
arbitrators.166 To its credit, AAA no longer does this, but more recently JAMS 
abandoned its refusal to administer arbitration agreements with class action waivers 
because of pressure from its business clients.167 
There are two ways in which an arbitrator appointing agency can slant the 
process to favor employers. First, the agency decides who it will list on its roster of 
arbitrators. Thus, the amended FAA should require that agencies employ objective 
and neutral criteria for determining whether to admit an arbitrator to their rosters. 
Agencies should bear a heavy burden of justifying the systematic exclusion of 
certain types of individuals from their rosters.168 Employer-promulgated mandatory 
arbitration systems that employ appointing agencies who fail to use uniform 
objective neutral criteria for listing arbitrators on their rosters should be prohibited. 
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Doing so will eliminate the temptation for agencies to curry favor with repeat 
customer employers by making their biased systems legally useless. 
The second way in which an agency can slant the process to favor employers is 
by controlling the composition of the specific panel of arbitrators given to the 
parties in a specific dispute. The desire for repeat business can be a powerful 
incentive for agencies to give their customers what the agencies think the 
customers want. In labor cases, for example, AAA tailors its panels in an effort to 
meet the needs of the parties in light of the particular dispute.169 Such tailoring may 
be appropriate where the agency has been selected mutually by the union and the 
employer. Like an arbitrator, the agency must curry favor with both adversaries to 
ensure their repeat business. Such tailoring is entirely inappropriate where the 
employer is the only party that controls whether the agency will see repeat 
business. 
Random selection from the overall roster is a method of composing a specific 
panel that reduces a repeat player’s ability to select the same arbitrator for multiple 
cases.170 The amended FAA should require, as a condition of enforcing mandatory 
arbitration provisions, that the arbitration system use random selection or a similar 
unbiased method for composing the panel from which the parties will select their 
arbitrator. 
The FAA amendment should also mandate strict disclosure rules for 
employment arbitrators. Professor Colvin found a significant repeat-arbitrator 
effect where employers were significantly more likely to prevail when appearing 
before an arbitrator multiple times.171 This does not necessarily reflect arbitrator 
bias. However, it is relevant to parties selecting an arbitrator. Consequently, 
arbitrators should be required to disclose prior dealings with parties, their lawyers, 
and their lawyers’ firms.172 
Finally, the amendment should address class actions. Class action waivers serve 
no purpose other than to insulate employers from liability for low value claims, but 
the Supreme Court has now insulated such waivers from state law invalidation 
when they are paired with an arbitration mandate.173 In one sense, the Court got it 
right. Class actions do not belong in arbitration. Space constraints do not allow me 
to elaborate fully on the problems encountered when arbitrating class actions, and 
others have already done so.174 As is universally recognized, in class actions, due 
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process concerns are heightened because absent class members can be bound by the 
outcome. In class action arbitrations, the arbitrator has the burden to ensure due 
process and protect the rights of absent class members.175 But the arbitrator has 
been mutually selected by the named claimants and the respondent, raising the 
question why should absent class members who have had no role in arbitral 
selection be forced to rely on the arbitrator to protect them. The problem is 
illustrated graphically when we consider class settlements. The adjudicator must 
ensure that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for all class members. 
Moreover, absent class members must be given notice of a proposed settlement and 
an opportunity to raise objections. Consider what would occur in class-action 
arbitration when absent class members raise objections to a proposed settlement. 
The named claimants and the respondents who agreed to and will advocate for the 
settlement are the same parties who chose the arbitrator who will now rule on the 
absent class members’ objections. From the objectors’ perspective, the deck is 
stacked against them because they are litigating their objections before an arbitrator 
selected by their opponents. There is no way to cure this appearance of arbitrator 
bias. Class actions belong in court and not in arbitration. Any legislative solution 
should ban the waiver of the right to bring a class action in court. 
Proponents of the AFA argue that if the abuses are eliminated and arbitration 
procedures are truly fair, they will be no faster and no cheaper than litigation and 
employers will no longer use them. The Raytheon experience suggests that they 
may be right.176 But that would only mean that regulation would have the same 
effect as prohibition. That is not an argument against regulation. 
When the Due Process Protocol was adopted, it provided valuable guidance to 
all parties trying to get employment arbitration right, including employers, 
arbitration service providers, and arbitrators.177 Experience since the Protocol has 
revealed numerous shortcomings.178 Amending the FAA to ensure fair employment 
arbitration processes would pick up where the Protocol left off.179 
A complete prohibition on pre-dispute arbitration mandates in employment 
contracts will not serve the interests of employees in having an accessible forum in 
which to adjudicate their claims. It will not serve the interests of employers in 
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having an adjudication procedure that can resolve claims quicker and cheaper. It 
will only serve the interests of that segment of the plaintiffs’ bar that wish to 
continue to play the lottery. We will not know whether statutory reform will 
preserve the accessibility, speed, and cost-effectiveness of the arbitral forum, but it 
is worth trying—the worst we end up with is a de facto ban. 
       
